Seton Hall University

eRepository @ Seton Hall
Law School Student Scholarship

Seton Hall Law

2020

Your Forced Arbitration is Now Arriving: How Pre-dispute
Mandatory Arbitration Clauses in the Uber Application Reflects
the Widening Gap Between Consumers and Businesses
Matthew Morris

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.shu.edu/student_scholarship
Part of the Law Commons

PART I: INTRODUCTION
One evening in Paris, during the winter of 2008, Travis Kalanick and Garrett
Camp experienced a dilemma that most people have experienced at least once in their lives: they
were unable to hail a cab.1 It was in this moment that their story became unique, for Kalanick
and Camp decided there should be an easier way for people all over the world to obtain
transportation from point A to point B.2 In March of 2009, their dream became a reality when
they founded UberCab, “a smartphone app that lets people tap a button and get a ride.”3
In a little over nine years, the company now called Uber has operated over 5 billion trips
in 65 countries and over 600 cities around the globe.4 They have partnered with several different
charities, provided jobs for the disabled and military veterans, established an UberPool option to
help reduce carbon emissions, and have even begun to operate self-driving vehicles in certain
cities.5 According to their website, they service 75 million riders, employ 3 million drivers, and
complete about 15 million trips each day.6 Uber has become an enormous international company
based on the premise of providing transportation whenever needed.7 The idea was simple, but
the logistics of employing that many drivers to provide rides each day creates the potential for
numerous complications.8 Camp and Kalanick’s creation massively improved modes of
transportation for the world, yet also created a huge problem for consumers and their ability to
sue Uber for any wrongdoings on the company’s part. Most consumers are either not familiar
with or do not fully understand what they are giving up when they enter into agreements that
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contain mandatory arbitration clauses.9 This note will focus on the pre-dispute mandatory
arbitration clauses that Uber inserted into their terms and conditions and how this type of clause
affects the average consumer.
Two recent cases have tackled the issue of whether or not these arbitration clauses are
conspicuous enough to be enforceable. These cases created what initially appears to be a circuit
split regarding the enforceability and conspicuousness of arbitration clauses that the average
consumer confronts when they register for an Uber account.10 What remains unclear after these
decisions is what is considered conspicuous enough to allow a consumer to waive their right to
sue Uber in court and whether these cases actually created a circuit split. The Uniform
Commercial Code defines “conspicuous” to mean “with reference to a term . . . so written,
displayed, or presented that a reasonable person against which it is to operate ought to have
noticed it.11 Whether a term is "conspicuous" or not is a decision for the court.”12 In the context
of smartphones, reasonable conspicuousness must be determined from the perspective of a
reasonably prudent smartphone user.13 In Meyer v. Uber Techs., Inc., the United States Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit first decided in a class action that Uber’s app provided
reasonably conspicuous notice of the terms of service as a matter of California law. 14 In
Cullinane v. Uber Techs., Inc., the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit created
the “split” by ruling for the plaintiffs, holding that users of the ride-sharing service were not
reasonably notified of the arbitration clause because the notice of the agreement was not
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Consumer Fin. Protection Bureau, Arbitration Study (2015),
https://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201503_cfpb_arbitration -study-report-to-congress-2015.pdf.
10 See Meyer v. Uber Techs., 868 F.3d 66, 78 (2d Cir. 2017); Cullinane v. Uber Techs., 893 F.3d 53, 55 (1st Cir.
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conspicuous within the meaning of Massachusetts’s law. 15 Though the courts came to different
decisions regarding whether the app’s interface was conspicuous enough to give the user notice
of its terms and conditions, it is not certain that these courts would actually disagree with each
other. As discussed further below, the layout of the Uber app in each case was different for the
users.16 The standard that the courts used to come to their holdings was essentially the same, but
the cases dealt with slightly different facts that may have affected the outcomes in each case.
These courts did not address the issue of whether or not mandatory arbitration clauses
that are contained inside the agreements of streamlined and frequently used mobile apps such as
Uber’s are fair to consumers. In this note, I will analyze this issue that the First and Second
circuits did not reach, as well as discuss the legislation that different states use to govern
questions of pre-dispute mandatory arbitration clauses in a world that is relying more and more
on technology in the daily lives of consumers. I first begin this note with a general discussion of
arbitration clauses and their use in web-based contracts. I then move to an analysis of the circuit
split between the First and Second Circuits. Finally, I review consumer understanding of
arbitration clauses and domestic and international legislation on arbitration and their advantages
and disadvantages. My discussion and analysis will show that even though states are attempting
to strike a balance between the needs of consumers and the practicability of arbitration for
corporations, the use of clickwraps and browsewraps in today’s technologically-dependent
society places a significant burden on the average smartphone user by creating more streamlined
contracts inside of apps that are used daily by consumers who have very little bargaining power.
In addition to that, the increasing inequality of bargaining power demonstrates the need for a
more evenhanded development of user agreements and use of arbitration clauses. The complete
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elimination of arbitration clauses in the Uber app is not realistic, nor is it practical, but Uber, and
other similar companies need to be much more conspicuous and transparent about what rights
consumers are waiving when they register. These issues will only increase as smartphones find
more ways to integrate themselves into our lives.

PART II: ARBITRATION CLAUSES AND THE CIRCUIT SPLIT
A. Arbitration Clauses and Procedures
The most common use for arbitration is to solve the problems of the tort system. 17
Generally speaking, parties involved in a dispute can agree after the fact to submit the dispute to
a forum other than a court of law.18 Likewise, “parties to a contract can agree at the time of
entering the contract to an alternative means of resolving” their disputes, if one were to arise
between them in the future.19 “The most common form of alternative dispute resolution (ADR)
provided for in contracts is final and binding arbitration in which a privately-appointed
individual – an arbitrator – is empowered to resolve claims that arise between the parties.” 20 The
American Arbitration Association’s boilerplate arbitration clause reads as follows:
1.1 Arbitration of future disputes.
(a) Scope, governing rules. Any controversy or claim arising out of or relating to this
Agreement, or the breach thereof, shall be determined by final and binding arbitration
administered by the American Arbitration Association ("AAA") under its Commercial
Arbitration Rules and Mediation Procedures ("Commercial Rules") [including, if
appropriate, [the Procedures for Large, Complex Commercial Disputes] [,/and] [the
International Commercial Arbitration Supplementary Procedures] [and] [the
Supplementary Rules for Class Arbitrations]]. 21
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“Arbitration provisions are now commonplace in consumer contracts. Consumers can choose to
pursue arbitration and waive their right to sue in court.”22 These clauses require the parties to
settle their dispute in the presence of an arbitrator who acts as a judge, by reviewing both parties’
arguments and making a decision based on those arguments and all evidence presented.23 In the
business context, these decisions are binding, and employers and various companies have
included such clauses in contracts to prevent the costly and time-consuming process of
litigation.24
Some advantages of arbitration are “diminished complexity in fact-finding, lower costs,
fairer results, greater access for smaller claims, and a reduced burden on the courts.” 25
Mandatory arbitration is not required to be included in contracts or in any setting by any state. 26
There are certain disadvantages to arbitration as well.27 These disadvantages mostly affect the
consumer such as when lawyers increase the costs and duration of arbitration that can sometimes
match litigation.28 Another disadvantage is the “repeat player” phenomenon. 29 Repeat players
are the institutions that engage in arbitration so regularly that they have a much higher victory
rate than employees or consumers who have rarely if ever participated in arbitration. 30 A study
in employment arbitration cases “found that the odds are 5-1 against the employee in a repeatplayer case.”31 Analysts believe that this disadvantage “may be due to the ability and incentive
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Atalese v. U.S. Leg. Services Group, 99 A.3d 306, 309 (N.J. 2014).
Arbitration, DICTIONARY.COM, https://www.dictionary.com/browse/arbitration
24 Christopher R. Drahozal & Samantha Zyontz, An Empirical Study of AAA Consumer Arbitrations, 25 OHIO ST . J.
ON DISP. R ESOL . 843, 848 (2010).
25 FURROW, ET . AL , supra note 17.
26 FURROW, ET . AL , supra note 17.
27 FURROW, ET . AL , supra note 17.
28 FURROW, ET . AL , supra note 17.
29 B ARRY R. FURROW ET AL., H EALTH LAW: C ASES, M ATERIAL AND PROBLEM s (8th ed. 2018).
30 FURROW, ET . AL , supra note 17.
31 FURROW, ET . AL , supra note 17.
23

7

of repeat players to track the predisposition of arbitrators and bias the selection process in their
favor.”32
In March of 2017, legislators introduced an amendment to the Federal Arbitration Act.33
This amendment, the Arbitration Fairness Act, aimed to prohibit pre-dispute arbitration clauses if
one party tried to enforce the clause on another in an employment, consumer, antitrust, or civil
rights dispute.34 Congress found that while “the Federal Arbitration Act was intended to apply to
disputes between commercial entities of generally similar sophistication and bargaining power,”
courts have extended its reach over the years through judicial interpretation to cover “consumer
disputes and employment disputes, contrary to the intent of Congress.”35 Congress also found
the following: “(1) most consumers and employees have little or no meaningful choice whether
to submit their claims to arbitration, (2) consumers and employees are often not even aware that
they have given up their rights, (3) pre-dispute mandatory arbitration undermines the
development of public law because there is inadequate transparency and inadequate judicial
review of arbitrators' decisions, and (4) arbitration can be an acceptable alternative when consent
to the arbitration is truly voluntary, and occurs after the dispute arises”.36 This bill never passed.
Thus, the unresolved concerns reflected in the congressional findings underscore the need for
further reform to both federal law and state law as well.37
While Congress began to question the role that mandatory arbitration clauses played in
consumers’ lives, courts seemed to be moving in the opposite direction. As one arbitration
scholar has noted, “[d]espite paying homage to the role of consent in arbitration, United States
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FURROW, ET. AL, supra note 17.
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34 Senate Bill 537.
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courts over time have moved away from the traditional definition of waiver (intentional
relinquishment of a known right) when the concept is applied to agreements for private
resolution of otherwise justiciable disputes.”38 Indeed, the courts have redefined “consent” to
mean “any evidence of an assent to arbitration,” regardless of whether the parties negotiate or
even know about the arbitration clause, whether the clause covers the subject matter of the claim,
and whether the clause is prohibited by state law.39 “The previously voluntary decision to trust
one’s fate to [ADR] has morphed into a compulsory obligation, so long as the relevant
counterparty inserts the magic word ‘arbitration’ somewhere into the contract.”40
B. Web-Based Contracts
One of the basic building blocks of contract law states that a contract is formed when
there is a meeting of the minds and a manifestation of mutual assent. 41 In order to have mutual
assent, the parties to a contract need to have a fundamental “understanding of the terms to which
they have agreed.”42 Acceptance of these terms can be as simple as an electronic ‘click’,
provided that the layout and language of the website afford “the user reasonable notice that a
click will manifest assent.”43 Contract formation via the internet “has not fundamentally
changed the principles of contract law.”44 Given society’s technological advances, web-based
contracts are a standard way for consumers to enter into agreements with producers. 45 Not only

Walter D. Kelley, Jr., “Mandatory Arbitration in the United States and Europe”, Hausfeld (Feb. 29, 2016),
https://www.hausfeld.com/news-press/mandatory-arbitration-in-the-united-state-and-europe?lang_id=1.
39 Kelley, supra note 38.
40 Kelley, supra note 38.
41 Hines v. Overstock.com, 668 F. Supp. 2d 362, 366 (E.D.N.Y. 2009).
42 Atalese v. U.S. Leg. Services Group, 99 A.3d 306, 313 (N.J. 2014).
43 6 David Bender, Computer Law § 61.05 (2018).
44 Hines v. Overstock.com, 668 F. Supp. 2d 362, 366 (E.D.N.Y. 2009).
45 Id. at 366.
38
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are they more commonplace, but the ease and speed with which these agreements are entered
into are unparalleled when compared with more traditional written contracts. 46
Courts have clarified, however, that different types of web-based agreements may require
varying level of assent in order for a contract to be valid.47 Clickwrap agreements require users
to click an “I agree” box after being presented with the terms.48 Browsewrap agreements
generally post terms on a website via a hyperlink at the bottom of the screen. 49 Courts routinely
uphold clickwraps because the user has affirmatively assented by clicking “I agree.” 50 Unlike
clickwraps, browsewraps do not require express assent.51 Because a browsewrap requires no
affirmative action other than use of the website, its validity depends on whether the user has
actual or constructive knowledge of the terms.52 Scrollwraps appear in some online agreements,
and require the user to scroll through the terms before the user can indicate his or her assent by
clicking "I agree.”53 These differ from clickwraps and browsewraps because users are required
to scroll through the terms and conditions before agreeing to them. Sign-in-wraps notify the user
of the existence of the website's terms of use and, instead of providing an "I agree" button, advise
the user that he or she is agreeing to the terms of service when registering or signing up.54 As
technology becomes more advanced, courts will need to continue to adapt to the different ways
that contracts are formed via the internet.
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Id. at 366.
6 David Bender, Computer Law § 61.05 (2018).
48 Bender, supra note 47.
49 Bender, supra note 47.
50 Hines, 668 F. Supp. 2d at 366.
51 Bender, supra note 47.
52 Bender, supra note 47.
53 Meyer v. Uber Techs., 868 F.3d 66, 75 (2d Cir. 2017).
54 Id. at 76.
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Presently, courts have not adapted the fundamental principles of contract law to contracts
formed through new technology.55 The basic tenets of contract law may still control, but courts
should be wary that the bargaining power of companies that take advantage of new innovations
in technology does not increase to such a level as to create a significant disadvantage for
consumers. Companies and consumers both adapt to changes in technology, but it is unclear
whether the effects these changes have on consumers’ rights are fully understood by these
companies, their consumers, and even by the courts.
C. The Second Circuit Takes on Pre-dispute Arbitration Clauses in Uber Agreements
Courts began to analyze mandatory arbitration clauses in mobile apps by reviewing how
the terms and conditions are displayed in the app. This analysis parallels how courts review
physical contracts between two parties. But the Second Circuit’s decision Meyer v. Uber Techs.,
demonstrates that courts do not always take into account the effects that these types of contracts
may have on consumers in future disputes such as the decrease in bargaining power and the costs
to the consumers.
Specifically, in Meyer v. Uber Techs., the plaintiff downloaded the Uber app on his
Samsung Galaxy S5 and took ten rides with Uber drivers in New York, Connecticut,
Washington, D.C., and Paris.56 On behalf of a putative class of Uber riders, Meyer sued Uber
“alleging the Uber App allowed drivers to fix prices amongst themselves, in violation of the
Sherman Act and the Donnelly Act.”57 The district court denied Uber’s motion to compel
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Hines, 668 F. Supp. 2d at 366.
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arbitration.58 It concluded that Meyer did not have reasonably conspicuous notice of the Terms
of Service and did not unambiguously manifest assent to the terms. 59
The Second Circuit addressed whether there was a valid agreement to arbitrate between
the plaintiffs and Uber and whether defendants waived their right to enforce an agreement to
compel arbitration.60 Looking to the Federal Arbitration Act, the district court concluded that if
an agreement to arbitrate existed, "it should then consider whether the dispute [fell] within the
scope of the arbitration agreement."61 In this case, the parties did not dispute that the plaintiffs’
claims would be covered by the arbitration provision of the Terms of Service. 62 Applying
California law based upon Uber’s principal place of business in accordance with the choice of
law clause in the contract’s terms and conditions, the court determined that the law in California
and New York regarding arbitration agreements was substantially similar.63
The court then began a discussion of different web-based contracts and the varying
ways that consumers agree to terms and conditions: clickwrap, browsewrap, scrollwraps, and
sign-in-wraps.64 In the interface at issue in Meyer, a putative user is not required to assent
explicitly to the contract terms; the user must instead click a button marked "Register,"
underneath which the screen states "[b]y creating an Uber account, you agree to the TERMS OF
SERVICE & PRIVACY POLICY," with hyperlinks to the Terms of Service and Privacy
Policy.65 The hyperlink in Meyer was blue, underlined, and the font was in all capital letters.66
The court first used an objective test to consider the perspective of a reasonably prudent
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Id. at 72.
Id. at 79.
60 Id. at 72.
61 Meyer, 868 F.3d at 74.
62 Id at 74.
63 Id. at 74.
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smartphone user in determining the question of reasonable conspicuousness.67 It discussed the
vast number of consumers that own smartphones and use apps that require them to enter into
contracts with different companies on a daily basis.68 The court concluded that the design of the
screen and the language used in Uber’s app rendered the notice provided reasonable as a matter
of California law.69 The court reasoned that the screen containing the link to the terms was
uncluttered, there was no scrolling required to see the link, and that it was blue and underlined
such that it was conspicuous enough for a reasonable user.70 The Court concluded that the
sentence that contained the link, "[b]y creating an Uber account, you agree to the TERMS OF
SERVICE & PRIVACY POLICY," was directly below the registration button, thereby implying
that by selecting “register” a consumer agreed to the terms contained in that link.71
The Court ultimately determined that the plaintiffs’ assent was unambiguous due to
the ample evidence that a reasonable user would be on inquiry notice of the terms.72 "Inquiry
notice is actual notice of circumstances sufficient to put a prudent man upon inquiry." 73 The
spatial and temporal coupling of the terms with the registration button "indicate[d ] to the
consumer that he or she is . . . employing such services subject to additional terms and conditions
that may one day affect him or her.”74 Thus, the court held that the consumer was bound by the
arbitration provision.
D. The First Circuit Finds the Terms and Conditions Not Conspicuous Enough for a
Reasonable User.
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Id. at 75.
Id. at 77.
69 Id. at 79.
70 Id. at 78.
71 Meyer, 868 F.3d at 78.
72 Id. at 78.
73 Schnabel v. Trilegiant Corp., 697 F.3d 110, 120 (2d Cir. 2012).
74 Meyer v. Uber Techs., 868 F.3d 66, 78 (2d Cir. 2017).
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The First Circuit’s decision in Cullinane v. Uber Techs., was a win for the consumers in
the case, but in the grand scheme, it may prove to not be as helpful as some believe.
Specifically, in Cullinane, four plaintiffs downloaded the Uber app on their smartphones and
registered for accounts.75 All four ordered Ubers for transportation in and around Boston76 and
claimed that Uber unnecessarily charged them the Massport Surcharge and the East Boston toll77
even though Massachusetts did not require such fees to be charged to Uber passengers.78
In deciding whether to enforce Uber’s purported arbitration clause, the First Circuit
closely analyzed the interface of Uber’s in-app registration process, providing screenshots of the
Uber app in its opinion.79 Describing in extensive detail each page of the registration process,
the court paid particular attention to the font color, size of any words on the page and the color of
the background.80 The “Terms of Service & Privacy Policy” hyperlink was in bold white text
enclosed in a gray rectangle on a black background. 81 An implication of agreement preceded the
hyperlink.82 The arbitration portion of the terms stated “[y]ou acknowledge and agree that you
and [Uber] are each waiving the right to a trial by jury or to participate as a plaintiff or class User
in any purported class action or representative proceeding.” 83 The Court compared
Massachusetts law with the Federal Arbitration Act which established that an agreement, written
in a contract to settle a controversy by arbitration shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable. 84
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Cullinane v. Uber Techs., 893 F.3d 53, 55 (1st Cir. 2018).
Id. at 55-6.
77 Id. at 56.
78 Id.
79 Id. at 56-8.
80 Cullinane, 893 F.3d at 56-8.
81 Cullinane, 893 F.3d at 57.
82 Id. at 57.
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84 Id. at 60.
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The Court then turned to whether a written agreement to arbitrate existed, and placed the
burden to show this on the party seeking to compel arbitration.85 It then applied Ajemian v.
Yahoo!, Inc., which set forth a two-step inquiry used to determine if an arbitration clause in this
case was enforceable.86 Under this approach, the first step determines whether the contract terms
were “reasonably communicated to the plaintiffs.”87 The second step determines whether the
record shows those terms were accepted and, if so, the manner of acceptance. 88 Uber claimed
that “its online presentation was sufficiently conspicuous” enough “to bind the plaintiffs whether
or not they chose to click through the relevant terms.” 89 The Court looked to the definition of
conspicuous under Massachusetts law to resolve the first step of the inquiry.90 It then concluded
that pursuant to the Massachusetts law, “conspicuous” is defined as so “written, displayed or
presented that a reasonable person against which it is to operate ought to have noticed it.” 91
Applying this standard, the court held that the plaintiffs were not reasonably notified of the terms
of the Agreement because Uber did not use a common method to display the terms and
conditions.92 It found that the link was not blue and underlined as hyperlinks usually are and that
there were many other noticeable terms on the page that diminished the conspicuousness of the
link for the terms and conditions.93 As to the second question, the First Circuit concluded that
“the fact that the plaintiffs were not reasonably notified of the terms of the Agreement,
[demonstrated] they did not provide their unambiguous assent to those terms.”94
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Cullinane, 893 F.3d at 60.
Id. at 61-2 (citing Ajemian v. Yahoo!, Inc., 83 Mass. App. Ct. 565, 575 (May 7, 2013)).
87 Id. at 62.
88 Id.
89 Id.
90 Cullinane, 893 F.3d at 62.
91 Cullinane, 893 F.3d at 62, (citing ALM GL ch. 106, § 1-201).
92 Cullinane, 893 F.3d at 62.
93 Id. at 63.
94 Id. at 64.
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The decisions by the First and Second Circuits that resulted in a “split”, only scratched
the surface of the real issue at stake. The First and Second circuits did not disagree on the
application of a federal law as the word “split” implies. Rather, they applied the appropriate
state law, and based on the facts that were given, came to different conclusions. These cases
focused on the appearance of the Uber interface that the plaintiffs experienced and whether or
not the links to the terms and conditions were conspicuous enough to put the plaintiffs on notice
that they were accepting the agreement and waiving their right to a trial by jury.95 The circuit
courts did not broach the issue of whether or not these clauses are inherently suspect or
prejudicial towards consumers. Perhaps, they took a narrow view of the arbitration clauses in
these cases to avoid the issue altogether. Referenced above, legislation in the United States
clearly supports the use of pre-dispute mandatory arbitration clauses, even in a mobile
application agreement such as the ones used by Uber. 96 Based on the facts of Meyer, it seems
that the First Circuit would have made the same decision as the Second Circuit if Uber
highlighted in blue instead of grey, the hyperlink that brought the user to the terms and
conditions, and if that particular screen was less cluttered. 97 Even if these facts were different
and the court held the terms and conditions were reasonably conspicuous to the user, as
addressed next, it still would not solve the issue of inequality between the consumer and the
business in their “meeting of the minds.”

PART III: HOW TECHNOLOGY HAS WIDENED THE GAP BETWEEN CONSUMERS
AND BUSINESSES
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The congressional findings in the proposed Arbitration Fairness Act, as well as the
original purpose of the Federal Arbitration Act, illustrate that there is a substantial need for more
consideration of the average consumer’s knowledge and rights in pre-dispute mandatory
arbitration clauses that appear in consumer contracts. As previously discussed, courts have
analyzed whether the terms and conditions are conspicuous enough to put an average consumer
on notice of the terms and if so, whether that is enough to hold them to the arbitration clause. 98
Courts, however, have not contemplated whether consumers as a class tend to understand what
rights they are waiving by registering for an account on an app even if the consumers know that
they are agreeing to the terms and conditions. Courts should instead be considering whether
consumers fully understand that they are giving up their right to a trial, whether the company, in
good faith, notified the consumer of such a waiver, and the bargaining power of both parties.
These factors should be considered along with the analysis shared by both the First and Second
Circuits. Mobile applications such as the one created by Uber expose more consumers to
contract agreements than any other type of consumer contract due to the frequency with which
mobile applications are used in our daily lives.99 While it is often argued that most consumers
actively choose not to read the terms and conditions in these mobile app agreements, whether or
not that is true, should not be dispositive of the issue. Just because consumers abstain from
reading the agreements does not mean they fully understand what rights they are waiving and
how this could affect them in the future. 100 Nor should they be forced to enter into an unfair
arbitration process. In traditional contract law, one who signs a contract without reading it, is
still bound by the contract.101 While that principle is reasonable between two parties that are on
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equal footing, it becomes untenable with the introduction of technology and the way in which it
is used by the average consumer today. Choosing to abstain from or to waive your rights to
something, when you do not have all of the relevant information should not lead you to be bound
by that agreement. Studies have shown that even when consumers read such terms and
conditions, they still do not understand the consequences of their assent.102 “Mutual assent
requires that the parties have an understanding of the terms to which they have agreed. An
effective waiver requires a party to have full knowledge of his legal rights and intent to surrender
those rights.”103 The First and Second Circuits did not address the real issue: whether predispute mandatory arbitration clauses in the mobile applications are fair to the consumer and
should be enforced.
A. Consumers’ Understanding of Arbitration Clauses
Today, there is an ever-increasing amount of people who buy smartphones, smart
watches, and tablets that allow you to download mobile applications that require the consumer to
enter into a contract in order to participate in that app’s services. 104 Some examples are: Lyft,
Venmo, Facebook, and any mobile banking app.105 As Chief Justice Roberts put it in Riley v.
California,106 “. . . modern cell phones are now such a pervasive and insistent part of daily life
that the proverbial visitor from Mars might conclude they were an important feature of human
anatomy.”107 Presumably because of our reliance on technology, and more specifically, our
phones, the objective of app developers is to make the registration process as quick and seamless
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CFPB 2015 Arbitration Study, supra note 9.
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106 134 S. Ct. 2473 (2014).
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as possible for the consumer. The average consumer today expects these kinds of processes to
be streamlined and efficient so that they can enjoy the app within minutes or even seconds of
downloading it. Uber’s novel app has changed the landscape of transportation services. Instead
of calling a phone number of an unfamiliar cab company, or standing on the sidewalk with your
hand in the air as handfuls of yellow cabs drive by, you can simply order a car to come pick you
up within minutes and usually for a reasonable rate. This service has become so popular, other
similar ride-sharing services such as Lyft or Via have entered the market.108
What people may not consider, or perhaps have chosen not to care about when they take
part in this exchange, is that they are entering into a contract to have a company provide a ride
for you and your belongings from point A to point B, and that many different legal issues can
arise from such a simple transaction. “An average member of the public may not know —
without some explanatory comment — that arbitration is a substitute for the right to have one's
claim adjudicated in a court of law.”109
The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) did a study in 2015 on arbitration
and one section specifically focused on what consumers understand about dispute resolution
systems specifically in credit card agreements. 110 When Congress passed the Dodd-Frank Wall
Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act in 2010, it instructed the CFPB to study “the use of
agreements providing for arbitration of any future dispute . . . in connection with the offering or
providing of consumer financial products or services,” and to report their findings back to
Congress.111 The survey explored the role of dispute resolution clauses in consumer decisions to
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acquire credit cards and consumers’ awareness, understanding, or knowledge of their dispute
resolution rights.112 The reason for this study, according to the CFPB, was because most “of the
empirical work on arbitration that has been carried out has not had a consumer financial
focus.”113 The majority of the consumers surveyed were unsure if they could sue the credit card
company in court when their agreements contained an arbitration clause. 114 Over a third
believed they could, knowing that their agreements contained arbitration clauses included in their
contracts.115 The results of the survey show most consumers are not aware of what arbitration
clauses are or whether or not they are included in their contracts. 116 A lack of knowledge in our
society on this subject is significant because of how frequently consumers are entering into these
types of agreements.
For example, when a person applies for a credit card, they are provided a credit card
agreement that contains all of the provisions of the contract. Whether or not they read this
information is their choice, but they are still presented with the agreement and its contents.
When registering for an account on Uber, the app simply provides a link to the terms and
conditions.117 The registrants are unable to visualize these terms and do not fully grasp what it is
that they are agreeing to.118 But even though the credit card applicants are able to hold the
physical agreement in their hands, it does not make a difference. 119 As the CFPB study shows,
even the credit card applicants who received a physical contract and were aware of the existence
of an arbitration agreement, did not fully grasp how that affected their rights. 120 Even if every
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consumer took the time to read their contracts, the CFPB study demonstrates that many of these
consumers will still not understand to what they are agreeing.
Holding consumers to contracts that require access to a lawyer to fully understand, would
also put a strain on businesses that rely on daily use of their services. This would become a
costly and time-consuming method for business and individual consumers who are entering into
these types of contracts on a daily basis. This demonstrates the need for clarity and unambiguity,
something that New Jersey is attempting to offer. The New Jersey Supreme Court (relying on
the New Jersey Arbitration Act, which is nearly identical to the Federal Arbitration Act) held that
“an arbitration clause, like any contractual clause providing for the waiver of a constitutional or
statutory right, must state its purpose clearly and unambiguously.”121 If anything is clear, it is
that most consumers do not understand the wording of pre-dispute mandatory arbitration clauses.
B. State Legislation
The Federal Arbitration Act requires courts to “place arbitration agreements on an equal
footing with other contracts and enforce them according to their terms.” 122 Consequently, “a
state cannot subject an arbitration agreement to more burdensome requirements than” other
contractual provisions.123 Thus, an arbitration clause cannot be invalidated by state-law
“defenses that apply only to arbitration or that derive their meaning from the fact that an
agreement to arbitrate is at issue.”124 This does not mean that courts will enforce every
arbitration clause regardless of how it is phrased.125 The Federal Arbitration Act “permits states
to regulate ... arbitration agreements under general contract principles,” and a court may
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invalidate an arbitration clause “‘upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation
of any contract.’”126
Some states’ laws on their face appear to be sufficient enough to protect the average
consumer. But as the decision in the Second circuit demonstrates, that is not the case. California
law is clear that “an offeree, regardless of apparent manifestation of his consent, is not bound by
inconspicuous contractual provisions of which he is unaware, contained in a document whose
contractual nature is not obvious."127 California contract law measures assent by an objective
standard that takes into account both what the offeree said, wrote, or did and the transactional
context in which the offeree verbalized or acted."128 Where there is no evidence that the offeree
had actual notice of the terms of the agreement, the offeree will still be bound by the agreement
if a reasonably prudent user would be on inquiry notice of the terms. 129 Whether a reasonably
prudent user would be on inquiry notice turns on the "[c]larity and conspicuousness of arbitration
terms."130 In the context of web-based contracts, clarity and conspicuousness are a function of
the design and content of the relevant interface. 131 Only if the undisputed facts establish that
there is "[r]easonably conspicuous notice of the existence of contract terms and unambiguous
manifestation of assent to those terms" will a court find that a contract has been formed.132
California and Massachusetts law are similar in their analyses of the enforceability of
web-based arbitration clauses.133 Under Massachusetts law, courts will enforce arbitration
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clauses in web-based contracts if there is reasonably conspicuous notice of the existence of
contract terms and unambiguous manifestation of assent to those terms by consumers.134 These
are essential if electronic bargaining is to have integrity and credibility. 135 Massachusetts law
uses the objective standard to determine if the terms are conspicuous to a reasonable person. 136
Despite the split in the circuit courts’ decisions, the cases highlight the fact that two different
states may have the same standards, but the facts of each case are highly relevant.
Unlike Massachusetts or California law, New Jersey law focuses not only on whether or
not the terms and conditions were conspicuous enough for the user, but also on whether the
provisions are sufficiently clear to place a consumer on notice that he or she is waiving a
constitutional or statutory right.137 In fact, under New Jersey law, this rule is not specific to
arbitration clauses, but to any contractual “waiver-of-rights provision.”138 The Court requires
that such provisions “reflect that [the party] has agreed clearly and unambiguously to its
terms.”139 The objective of this approach “is to assure that the parties know that in electing
arbitration as the exclusive remedy, they are waiving their time-honored right to sue.”140 For
example, in Atalese v. U.S. Legal Services Group, L.P., the New Jersey Supreme Court
invalidated an arbitration clause because “nowhere in the arbitration clause [was] there any
explanation that plaintiff is waiv[ed] her right to seek relief in court for a breach of her statutory
rights.”141 The provision in that case “[did] not explain what arbitration is, nor [did] it indicate
how arbitration is different from a proceeding in a court of law. Nor [was] it written in plain
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language that would be clear and understandable to the average consumer that she is waiving
statutory rights.”142 All predispute mandatory arbitration clauses trigger unequal bargaining
power and uninformed consent issues.143
Instead of allowing these issues to continue, states should elevate the requirements of the
conspicuousness of a corporation’s terms and conditions in mobile applications. The high rate at
which smartphone users download and partake in mobile application services daily, and the
growing trend of streamlined registration processes emphasize the need for more consumer
protection when agreeing to a company’s terms and conditions. 144 It is a basic principle in
contract law that “absent fraud, duress or mutual mistake, that one having the capacity to
understand a written document who reads and signs it, or, without reading it or having it read to
him, signs it, is bound by his signature in law, at least.”145 States need to adapt their contract
laws to the technological advances of today’s world. One way in which terms and conditions of
web-based or mobile application contracts can be written more fairly for consumers is to have
the requirement of specific assent to all clauses that result in the waiver of rights in clickwrap
agreements.146
For example, consistent with this approach, one commentator has highlighted the fact that
“[w]rap contracts contain blanket assent, the all-or-nothing provision in which the contract is
formed entirely if there is an opportunity to read.” However, in [her] proposal, for each rightsforeclosure provision, the non-drafting party must click "I agree."147 Consumers would then
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have more of an opportunity to see the specific provision that waives their rights before they
agree to it.148 This proposal could be implemented into the terms and conditions that users must
agree to when registering for an account on the Uber App. Uber and other similar businesses
would also be less inclined to insert any unconscionable terms into the agreement.149 This active
participation on the consumer’s part is beneficial for those businesses as well.150 Indeed, review
by the consumers of each rights-foreclosure provision would create more certainty that
consumers actually agreed to the terms and are therefore bound by them.151 As a result, this
could save Uber money in dealing with lengthy litigation over whether or not the contract is
enforceable.152 Even if Uber is allowed to prohibit users from registering if they do not agree to
the specific arbitration provision, then at least the user is now aware of what right they are giving
up if they decide to agree. At first, most people will probably agree in order to obtain the
convenient service that they offer. But as more and more consumers are faced with this dilemma
of whether to waive their right to a trial for the convenience of the app, it will force companies
like Uber to change their policies in order to compete.
Applying the approach used by the Court in Atalese regarding the clarity of the
arbitration clause, the arbitration provisions in Uber’s agreement should clearly define
arbitration, how it is different from a trial in a court of law, and what right is being waived.153
This way, the consumer is automatically brought to the arbitration clause when registering,
required to agree to this clause specifically before registration is complete, and will be able to
better understand what they are agreeing to at the time they agree to it and not after a dispute
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arises. This idea would require the consumer to spend more time on the registration process, but
given the demand for ride-share services, it is hard to imagine that this would deter many people
from signing up for an account. Admittedly, there are many different aspects of an arbitration
clause, which are reflected in Uber’s terms and conditions. 154 Currently, the Uber App arbitration
clause starts with this section highlighted in bold font unlike the rest of the agreement:
By agreeing to the Terms, you agree that you are required to resolve any claim that you
may have against Uber on an individual basis in arbitration, as set forth in this Arbitration
Agreement. This will preclude you from bringing any class, collective, or representative
action against Uber, and also preclude you from participating in or recovering relief
under any current or future class, collective, consolidated, or representative action
brought against Uber by someone else.155
Underneath this conspicuous section are many more provisions regarding arbitration. 156 This
bold section referenced above would be a fitting place for Uber to require the registrant go, to
specifically agree to these terms. If Uber were to follow the approach set forth in Atalese, they
could use the above section to delineate in simple terms what arbitration means, how it is
different from a trial in a court of law, and what right is being waived. 157 An enforceable
arbitration agreement “at least in some general and sufficiently broad way, must explain that [a]
plaintiff is giving up her right to bring her claims in court or have a jury resolve the dispute.”158
The CFPB study underscores the fact that even though there are thousands of people who
may enter into contracts with credit card companies, a majority of people will choose not to
litigate over incorrect fees or other wrongs committed by the companies. 159 Corporations impose
pre-dispute mandatory arbitration clauses in order to avoid the costs of frequent and lengthy
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trials.160 The reality is, however, that most consumers share this goal. To avoid going to trial
many would rather accept the incorrect fee or just cancel their account. 161 Taking into account
the demand for Uber rides and the fact that Uber provides 15 million rides per day to 75 million
users, adding the specific-assent proposal with clear, unambiguous language to Uber’s user
agreement would not be such an inconvenience to new Uber users that they would not sign up
for an account. It may cost Uber money to implement this change to their interface, but it would
also potentially save them the time and energy of having to defend cases like Meyer or Cullinane
in court because more consumers would be aware of the procedure.
C. Consumer Protection Laws Abroad
The European Union (EU) is much more strict when it comes to these pre-dispute
mandatory arbitration clauses and offers a potential model here.162 In 1993, the EU passed the
Unfair Contract Terms Directive (UCTD) because advancements in technology generated a
pervasiveness of unfair practices in non-negotiated contracts.163 The EU came to the realization
that these non-negotiable standard-form contract provisions needed to be regulated otherwise
there would be abuses.164 The UCTD works to render a contract “unenforceable if the terms (1)
are non-negotiable, (2) create significant imbalance between the rights of the parties, and (3) that
imbalance is contrary to good faith.”165 Certain clauses are “presumed to be unfair because they
unreasonably shift risk to the consumer.”166 Among many clauses that are blacklisted whenever
they appear as non-negotiable are browsewrap or clickwrap contract formation and pre-dispute
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mandatory arbitration.167 If a business based in the United States offers a product or service in
the EU, they must alter their contracts in order to comply with the stricter consumer protection
laws.168 According to their website, Uber operates in 144 cities in Europe. 169 While not all of
these are necessarily in the EU, there are still numerous cities in the EU in which Uber operates.
This means that if Uber does not adjust their clauses, then they are in noncompliance with the
UCTD and their existing clauses are potentially subject to invalidation if challenged .
Besides blacklisting certain provisions, the UCTD also provides that contract terms must
be “drafted in plain and intelligible language, and states that ambiguities shall be interpreted in
favor of consumers."170 This legislation has improved “the balance between consumers and
businesses” and has also deterred businesses “from utilizing their superior bargaining power in a
manner that oppresses parties who lack such power.” 171 The EU places and emphasis on striking
a balance between consumers and businesses because it believes that businesses should act in
good faith when dealing with consumers and non-negotiable contract terms can lead to abuses. 172
Other members of the EU have executed laws that are even more protective of consumers
than the UCTD.173 Arbitration clauses in the United Kingdom are presumed to be prejudicial “if
the amount at issue is less than £ 5000.”174 Arbitration clauses in general are completely
prohibited in France when they are employed in domestic disputes such as divorce or custody
issues.175 In Sweden, arbitration clauses in contracts for “the sale of goods and services for
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private use” are generally prohibited.176 “Germany won’t enforce a consumer arbitration clause
unless it is in a separate, signed document or part of a fully notarized contract.”177
The Canadian government has also taken steps to provide more protection for their
citizens when dealing with pre-dispute mandatory arbitration clauses.178 In Ontario, you are not
bound by “clauses to a contract that say that you must use a private arbitration process to resolve
complaints instead of going to court or seeking assistance from the Ministry of Government and
Consumer Services . . . even if you have accepted the agreement.”179 Similarly, there is a
Consumer Protection Act in Quebec that states,
[a]ny stipulation that obliges the consumer to refer a dispute to arbitration, that
restricts the consumer’s right to go before a court, in particular by prohibiting the
consumer from bringing a class action, or that deprives the consumer of the right to
be a member of a group bringing a class action is prohibited.180
The consumer may agree to go to arbitration if a dispute occurs after the contract has been
entered into, but they cannot be forced to do so.181
Arbitration clauses used by companies such as Uber have a legitimate purpose and the
advantages of their use are compelling enough to allow these companies to use them. The cost
and length of litigation can be onerous, especially when a company’s product is used as
frequently as Uber’s. The act of eliminating arbitration clauses altogether may benefit
consumers greatly, but it would also place a huge burden on companies to deal with costly and
time-consuming litigation that could result in a significant depletion of their resources. Though
many countries have done away with arbitration clauses, others have simply increased their
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consumer protection, while still allowing these clauses to exist in certain situations discussed
above. At the very least, The United States needs to follow suit and increase consumer protection
when it comes to arbitration clauses. More transparency about what rights the consumers are
waiving as well as a more conspicuous agreement will greatly improve consumer protection.

PART IV: CONCLUSION
As scholars have begun to recognize, the gap between consumer contracts and contract
law is causing consumer contracts to become predominantly more one-sided, unreadable,
unnoticeable, and more favorable to businesses. 182 As technology continues to advance and the
human race becomes more and more reliant on it to serve us in our daily lives, this gap will only
continue to grow. Referenced earlier, “businesses would [] benefit from clear standards
regarding contract presentation and what is considered unconscionable.”183 The courts need to
move away from interpreting whether the terms and conditions are accessible and easily
discoverable to the average consumer. They should move towards a more beneficial test that
places emphasis not only on the average consumer’s ability to comprehend the magnitude and
the consequences of the contracts into which they are entering on a frequent basis but also on
whether or not they even understand that they are entering into a contract in the first place.
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